The Impact of Successful and Failed Oversight Functions on Corruption Prevention within the Ministry of Social Affairs

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Introduction

Social issues in Indonesia are becoming increasingly complex in terms of both nature and scale. In several dimensions, these issues have evolved into social welfare challenges that require rapid, precise, and specialized intervention. Although the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia has undertaken various measures, empirical evidence indicates that many individuals facing social welfare issues (PMKS) remain unreached by social services. The accelerating pace and complexity of these social welfare issues are a matter of concern for the Inspectorate General—an integral part of the Ministry of Social Affairs—as it seeks to contribute significantly to enhancing the Ministry's performance in carrying out its duties and functions. The Inspectorate General is expected to play a more active role in supporting successful social welfare development, underpinned by commitment, professionalism, and independence. It is also expected to foster a positive image among other personnel—particularly leaders of organizational units or work units—encouraging them to view oversight officials as equal partners who rely on, complement, and support one another in achieving organizational goals.

Drawing lessons from past shortcomings regarding the forms and models of oversight employed, future efforts will focus on oversight areas such as service management, assistance management, financial and asset management, and human resource management. In this regard, the Ministry of Social Affairs' Inspectorate General can play a role in establishing and refining management systems—encompassing planning, organizing, implementation, and control—to ensure superior management practices.

These requirements pertain to both operational units and the general public, covering oversight in areas such as administration, finance, asset management, and the procurement of goods and services. Additionally, oversight will involve pilot testing and model development, as well as the evaluation of ongoing activities or programs, to propose alternatives that are better, more cost-effective, and capable of yielding results more quickly. The Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible not only for carrying out its general duties and functions but also—in accordance with Article 48, Paragraph (2) of Government Regulation Number 60 of 2008 concerning the Government Internal Control System (SPIP)—for conducting oversight through audits (performance audits and audits with specific objectives), reviews, evaluations, monitoring, and other supervisory activities. Furthermore, regarding the implementation of Bureaucratic Reform and in accordance with the Regulation of the Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform Number 20 of 2010 concerning the Bureaucratic Reform Roadmap, the Inspectorate General is responsible for the "Strengthening Oversight" program, which comprises the following activities: a) implementation of SPIP within each work unit across Ministries/Agencies, and b) enhancement of the role of the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP) in providing quality assurance and consulting services. A Strategic Plan is a medium-term (5-year) planning document containing the vision, mission, goals, strategies, policies, programs, and development activities aligned with the duties and functions of a Ministry or Agency; it is formulated in accordance with the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJM Nasional) and serves as an indicative guide. The Ministry of Social Affairs' Strategic Plan for 2010–2014 aligns not only with the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJM Nasional) for 2009–2014 but also with the Ministry of Social Affairs' Roadmap for 2010–2014. Pursuant to Article 15 paragraph (1) and Article 19 paragraph (2) of Law Number 25 of 2004 concerning the National Development Planning System, every Ministry or Agency is required to formulate a Ministry/Agency Strategic Plan (Renstra-KL) to ensure linkage and consistency among planning, budgeting, implementation, and oversight, as well as to guarantee the efficient, effective, equitable, and sustainable use of resources. Law Number 17 of 2003 concerning State Finance introduced fundamental changes to the approach used for budget formulation.

These fundamental changes encompass the implementation of a medium-term perspective in budgeting (Medium Term Expenditure Framework), the application of a unified budget approach (Unified Budget), and the adoption of performance-based budgeting (Performance-Based Budgeting). Based on the aforementioned legal framework, the Inspectorate General—as an Echelon I unit within the Ministry of Social Affairs—is required to formulate a Strategic Plan to serve as the basis for its budgeting approach and to further ensure the linkage between planning and budgeting processes. The year 2014 marks the final year of the five years covered by the Inspectorate General’s Strategic Plan (2010–2014), which is aligned with the Ministry of Social Affairs' Strategic Plan for the same period. The strategic plan in question will serve to support the Inspectorate General's direction and policies in achieving established goals and objectives, while adapting to changing conditions and the evolving dynamics of the organization's mandate to meet stakeholder demands for good governance.

Acting as a provider of quality assurance for Social Welfare Development programs, the Inspectorate General is committed to enhancing performance and accountability regarding the management of state funds—both received and expended—for the administration and development of social welfare; this commitment will be reflected in the annual audit opinions issued by the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK).

Oversight findings from Government Internal Supervisory Bodies (the Inspectorate General, provincial inspectorates, and BPKP), as well as external audit results from the BPK, will inform policy decisions regarding the oversight of social welfare development in Indonesia. The role of human resource management is becoming increasingly significant as the organization evolves; consequently, there is a demand for effective performance in this area, not only to strengthen internal oversight but also to curb the abuse of authority by personnel within the organization.

Literature Review

Success of the Supervisory Function In essence, supervision encompasses various activities designed to safeguard operations and measure whether activities are being carried out successfully in accordance with the plan. K. Suhendra (2008) [29] posits that supervision is fundamentally a set of activities aimed at ensuring and measuring the successful execution of operations according to the plan.

Siagian (2020) [26] defines supervision as the process of monitoring the execution of all organizational activities to ensure that ongoing work proceeds according to pre-established plans. M. Ichwan (2014) [10] states that supervision is the process of comparing activity execution against benchmarks or criteria, followed by corrective actions.

Bangun (2020) [2] suggests that supervision is a process for assessing the alignment of work performed by organizational members—across various fields and management levels— with previously established programs. When the work produced by members aligns with the initial plan, it signifies that organizational goals have been achieved. Based on the descriptions above, it can be concluded that the success of the supervisory function involves a process of identifying execution results, errors, and failures to implement improvements and prevent the recurrence of mistakes; this function is characterized by efficiency, effectiveness, productivity, and a preventive nature, while also ensuring that errors are recognized and that standards are observed.

Failure of the Supervisory Function In general, supervision is defined as an administrative activity aimed at evaluating completed work to determine whether it aligns with the plan.

Reksohadiprodjo (2021) [23] posits that supervision is an effort to provide guidance to those executing tasks, ensuring they consistently act in accordance with the plan. Terry and Leslie (2020) argue that supervision takes the form of inspections to verify that work is being carried out as intended, while also alerting managers to potential issues before they escalate into serious problems.

Sarwoto (2015) [25] states that "supervision is a managerial activity aimed at ensuring work is executed in accordance with established plans or desired outcomes." Fathoni (2018) defines supervision as a process of designating personnel or units to act on behalf of organizational leadership; these agents are tasked with gathering the data and information necessary for leadership to assess progress or setbacks in work execution. Manullang (2018) notes that supervision is conducted by the relevant employee's superior; this type of oversight is known as vertical or formal supervision because it is carried out by authorized individuals. Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that a failure in the supervision function stems from weak oversight by leadership regarding the proper execution of tasks. In other words, such failure reflects a lack of effort by leaders to ascertain and evaluate the actual reality of the subject being supervised—specifically, whether it aligns with expectations. Indicators of this supervisory failure include weak leadership oversight, as well as subordinate indifference and non-compliance regarding assigned mandates and duties.

Corruption Prevention Corruption is not a new phenomenon in the history of human civilization. It has been recognized and discussed for as long as 2,000 years, dating back to when Kautilya, a Prime Minister in an ancient Indian kingdom, wrote the Arthashastra. Similarly, seven centuries ago, Dante wrote about corruption—specifically bribery—as a criminal act. Suwartojo (2001) defines corruption as the behavior or actions of one or more individuals that violate established norms through the use or abuse of power or opportunity. This occurs during processes such as procurement, the imposition of levies or revenue collection, and the granting of facilities or other services—specifically involving the receipt or disbursement of funds or assets, the custody of funds or assets, and the issuance of permits or other services—with the aim of securing personal or group gain, thereby directly or indirectly harming the interests and/or finances of the state or the public.

Meanwhile, Brooks (cited in Alatas, 2002) [1] defines corruption as the intentional commission of a wrong or the neglect of a known duty, or the unauthorized exercise of power, for the purpose of obtaining a gain that is, to some extent, personal in nature.

Quah (2000), in a macro-level study of corruption within public bureaucracies across ASEAN, concluded that Indonesia is among the countries with a "hopeless strategy" for eradicating corruption. This assessment is characterized by political leadership that lacks the resolve to combat corruption and by anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms that remain fragmented.

Hosmer (2001) identifies a lack of ethical insight or a leader's indifference toward ethical guidance within an organization as factors driving individual corrupt behavior; meanwhile, research in strategic management highlights the difficulty organizations face in aligning ethics with organizational strategy when pursuing goals.

Based on the preceding explanation, it can be concluded that corruption prevention entails averting any form of deviation from the mandate or duties assigned by a superior to a subordinate. This is achieved through supervision, preventive measures, audits, and enforcement actions—the latter serving as a form of "shock therapy" to deter violators from repeating their actions.

Research Methodology

This study employs a survey research method with a quantitative, correlational approach. It aims to assess the extent to which the independent variables—specifically the success and failure of the supervisory function—influence the dependent variable, namely corruption prevention. The study focuses on a specific group of individuals: employees within the Ministry of Social Affairs. Through this method, the author seeks to conduct an in-depth examination of specific aspects of a social situation—in this case, the impact of the success or failure of supervisory functions on corruption prevention.

In general, a population is defined as a general area consisting of objects or subjects possessing specific qualities and characteristics (Sugiyono, 2019) [28]. The population for this study comprises officials within the Ministry of Social Affairs, totaling 120 employees. Regarding the sample, Sugiyono (2019) [28] describes it as a subset representing the size and characteristics of the population. For this study, the sample size was determined using the formula by Taro Yamane (as cited in Riduwan, 2020) [24]. The population consisted of 120 officials within the Ministry of Social Affairs, and a precision level of 10% was established. Based on this formula, a sample size (n) of 55 respondents was obtained from the Ministry of Social Affairs, without regard to stratification.

Data collection was conducted using a questionnaire, involving the distribution of a set of written questions or statements for respondents to answer. Data processing was performed using multiple linear regression analysis.

1. Results of Hypothesis Testing on the Effect of the

Success of the Oversight Function (X1) on Corruption The hypotheses proposed by the author for analysis are as follows: significant effect of the success of the oversight function (X1) on corruption prevention (Y). significant effect of the success of the oversight function (X1) on corruption prevention (Y).

To test these hypotheses, the author employs Product Moment analysis. The formula for Product Moment correlation analysis is:

Next, regarding the calculation of the value representing the effectiveness of the supervisory function in preventing corruption within the Ministry of Social Affairs, the results are as follows:

Based on the calculation results, the correlation coefficient was found to be rx1y = 0.728. Upon comparing this value with the previously established interpretation guidelines, it was determined that the correlation coefficient falls into the "strong positive" category, as it lies within the 0.600–0.799 interval. This indicates that the effectiveness of the supervisory function has a strong positive influence on corruption prevention within the Ministry of Social Affairs. Meanwhile, the contribution of the supervisory function's effectiveness to corruption prevention can be determined by calculating the coefficient of determination (r²) using the Kd =r2 x 100 % = 53,1% Based on these calculations, the effectiveness of the oversight function accounts for 53.1% of the influence on corruption prevention, while the remaining 46.9% is influenced by other factors. In addition to the effectiveness of the oversight function, other factors—such as employee work culture— also influence corruption prevention.

Furthermore, to determine whether the influence of the oversight function's effectiveness on corruption prevention within the Ministry of Social Affairs is significant, a significance test is conducted using the t-test formula, as follows:

Based on the calculations above, the calculated t-value was found to be 7.741. This value was then compared to the t-table value at a 5% significance level using a two-tailed test with degrees of freedom (df) calculated as n - k (55 - 2 = 53), resulting in a t-table value of 2.000. Consequently, it is concluded that the null hypothesis (Ho)—stating there is no positive and significant influence of the supervisory function's success on corruption prevention—is rejected, while the alternative hypothesis (Ha)—stating there is a positive and significant influence—is accepted. Thus, the calculated t-value falls within the region supporting Ha; the correlation coefficient of 0.728 between the success of the supervisory function and corruption prevention indicates a strong, positive, and significant relationship, implying that this coefficient applies to the entire population.

2. Hypothesis Test Results Regarding the Effect of

Supervisory Function Failure (X2) on Corruption The hypotheses proposed by the author for analysis are as follows: significant effect of supervisory function failure (X2) on significant effect of supervisory function failure (X2) on To test the hypothesis concerning the relationship between supervisory function failure and corruption prevention, the author employs product-moment analysis. The formula for product-moment correlation analysis (Sugiyono, 2019) [29] is as follows:

The calculation regarding the failure of the oversight function concerning corruption prevention within the Ministry of Social Affairs yields the following results:

Meanwhile, the contribution of the failure of the supervisory function to corruption prevention can be determined by calculating the coefficient of determination (r²) using the Kd = r2 x 100 % = 46,0% Based on these calculations, this means that 46.0% of supervisory function failures influence corruption prevention, while the remaining 54.0% are influenced by other factors. Apart from the failure of the supervisory function, there are other factors that influence the prevention of corruption, such as employee work ethic. Furthermore, to find out whether the influence of the failure of the supervisory function on preventing corruption within the Ministry of Social Affairs is significant or not, it is necessary to test its significance using the t formula, which is as follows:

The calculation yielded a calculated t-value of 6.723. When compared to the t-table value—based on a 5% significance level for a two-tailed test and degrees of freedom (df) of n-k (55 - 2 = 53), resulting in a t-table value of 2.000—it can be concluded that the null hypothesis (Ho), stating there is no positive and significant influence of supervisory function failure on corruption prevention, is rejected, while the alternative hypothesis (Ha), stating there is a positive and significant influence, is accepted. Thus, the calculated t-value falls within the Ha region (indicating acceptance of the hypothesis); the correlation coefficient of 0.678 between supervisory function failure and corruption prevention represents a strong, positive, and significant relationship, implying that this coefficient applies to the entire population.

3. Hypothesis Test Results Regarding the Combined

Effect of Supervisory Function Success (X1) and Supervisory Function Failure (X2) on Corruption The hypothesis formulated for analysis—examining the combined relationship of supervisory function success and supervisory function failure with corruption prevention using multiple correlation—is as follows: significant combined effect of supervisory function significant combined effect of supervisory function Before conducting the multiple correlation hypothesis test regarding the combined effect of supervisory function corruption prevention (Y), the correlation between supervisory function success (X1) and supervisory function failure (X2) is first calculated (Appendix 13) using the rx1x2 = = = = Furthermore, to test the multiple correlation between the success of the supervisory function (X1) and the failure of the supervisory function (X2)—considered jointly—and corruption prevention (Y) within the Ministry of Social Affairs, the following formula (Sugiyono, 2019) [29] can be used:

0,5271 0,71750,4600,531 21− −+=yXXR 0,4731 −=yXXR 0,4731 0,2734 21=yXXR 0,57821=yXXR 0,76021=yXXR Based on the calculation results, the multiple correlation coefficient obtained is Rx1x2y = 0.760. Upon comparing this value against the previously established interpretation guidelines, it is determined that the multiple correlation coefficient falls into the "strong" category. This indicates that the success and failure of the supervisory function, considered jointly, exert a strong positive influence on corruption prevention within the Ministry of Social Affairs. This influence applies to the entire population. To predict the magnitude of the joint influence of the success and failure of the supervisory function on corruption prevention within the Ministry of Social Affairs, the coefficient of determination is calculated by squaring the correlation coefficient (R²), using the following formula:

Kd = R2 x 100 % = 57,8% This means that the success and failure of the supervisory function—acting jointly—account for 57.8% of the influence on corruption prevention, while the remaining 42.2% is influenced by other factors. Beyond the success and failure of the supervisory function, other factors—such as the superior's leadership style—also impact corruption prevention.

Furthermore, to test the significance of the multiple correlation between the success and failure of the supervisory function (combined) and corruption prevention—and to assess the generalizability of these findings to the entire population—the author conducted a test by calculating the F-calculated value and comparing it against the F-table value using the following formula (Sugiyono, 2019) [29]:

The calculated F-value is 35.607; this value is then compared against the F-table value. With degrees of freedom (df) for the numerator = 2 and df for the denominator = (55 - 2 - 1) = 52, the F-table value at a significance level of 5% is 3.17. The rule applied here is that if the calculated F-value exceeds the F-table value, the multiple correlation coefficient being tested is significant—meaning it applies to the entire population. Based on the calculation above, where the calculated F-value exceeds the F-table value (35.607 > 3.17), it can be stated that the multiple correlation is strong, positive, and significant, and is valid for the context from which the sample was drawn. Consequently, the hypothesis stating that there is a strong, positive, and significant influence of the success and failure of the supervisory function—considered jointly—on corruption prevention within the Ministry of Social Affairs is accepted (or proven); this implies that when the success of the supervisory function is high and the failure of the supervisory function is low, corruption prevention will be maximized.

4. Multiple Regression Analysis Results

Multiple regression analysis is used to predict the extent to which changes in the independent variables (the success and failure of the supervisory function) affect the dependent variable (corruption prevention) within the Ministry of Social Affairs. This multiple regression analysis is expressed by the following equation:

Y =a + b1X1 + b2X2 =0,788 + 0,498 X1 + 0,316 X2 The regression equation for the combined effect of successful and failed oversight functions on corruption prevention is: Ŷ = 0,788 + 0,498 X1 + 0,316 X2. This means that fluctuations in corruption prevention—driven by the success or failure of the oversight function—can be predicted using that regression equation.

Based on the data, the highest scores for the success and failure of the oversight function are 75 (5 x 15). 5 is the highest value for each answer, and 15 is the number of question items. Therefore, corruption prevention is:

Ŷ = 0,788 + 0,498 + 0,316. 75 = 0,788 + 61,05 = 61,838 It turns out that if the success of the oversight function is increased to 75—and its failure reduced accordingly— corruption prevention improves from 0.788 to 61.838. This indicates that the higher the success rate of the oversight function and the lower its failure rate, the greater the improvement.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on the research conducted to test the hypotheses and address the formulated research questions, the researcher draws the following conclusions:

1. The hypothesis test regarding the success of the supervisory function and its impact on corruption prevention within the Ministry of Social Affairs reveals a strong, positive, and significant influence, indicated by a correlation coefficient of 0.728. The coefficient of determination (r²) is 0.531, meaning that 53.1% of corruption prevention is determined by the success of the supervisory function, while the remaining 46.9% is determined by other factors; thus, the hypothesis (Ha)— stating there is a strong, positive, and significant influence of the success of the supervisory function on corruption prevention—is accepted.

2. The hypothesis test regarding the failure of the supervisory function and its impact on corruption prevention within the Ministry of Social Affairs reveals a strong, positive, and significant influence, indicated by a correlation coefficient of 0.678. The coefficient of determination (r²) is 0.460, meaning that 46.0% of corruption prevention is determined by the failure of the supervisory function, while the remaining 54.0% is determined by other factors; thus, the hypothesis (Ha)— stating there is a strong, positive, and significant influence of the failure of the supervisory function on corruption prevention—is accepted.

3. The multiple correlation hypothesis test regarding the combined impact of the success and failure of the supervisory function on corruption prevention within the Ministry of Social Affairs reveals a strong, positive, and significant influence, with a correlation coefficient of 0.760. Meanwhile, the coefficient of determination (R²) is 0.578, indicating that 57.8% of corruption prevention is collectively determined by the success and failure of the supervisory function, while the remaining 42.2% is determined by other factors; this means the hypothesis (Ha) is accepted—specifically, that there is a strong, positive, and significant influence of the success and failure of the supervisory function, acting jointly, on corruption prevention.

Recommendations

Based on the research findings and the discussion presented in the conclusion above, the author offers the following recommendations for potential implementation: 1. The effectiveness of the supervisory function should be enhanced through routine and continuous direct supervision by leadership, the implementation of preventive and pre-emptive measures, and proactive efforts to prevent organizational irregularities. 2. Failures in the supervisory function should be minimized by intensifying leadership oversight in operational areas prone to irregularities, providing fair compensation to honest employees, and maintaining direct supervision both within and outside the organization.

3. Corruption prevention efforts should be further

strengthened by enhancing internal and external oversight, taking firm enforcement action and imposing strict sanctions on employees who commit acts of corruption—serving as a deterrent—while ensuring that all enforcement actions comply with applicable laws and regulations.